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Abstract 
This article presents four scenarios on the future of North Korea when its dictator, Kim Jong Il, will 
die. Kim is suffering from health problems and his passing away may have serious results for the 
stability at the Korean peninsula—and thus for the international community. The four scenarios 
vary between a smooth succession of Kim by his youngest son without any major changes in 
North Korea, to a struggle for power with anarchy and chaos as a result. If the regime implodes, 
both a unilateral intervention by China as a multilateral intervention by South Korea, the United 
States, and other countries, are possible. Although predicting developments in North Korea is 
impossible, the author argues that these scenarios can at least assist the international community 
in preparing for sudden changes at the Korean peninsula. 
Introduction 
The surprising visit of former U.S. President Bill Clinton to North Korea in August 2009 resulted 
not only in the release of the two imprisoned American journalists he was aiming for. One other 
interesting result of his visit was that the international community witnessed that Kim Jong Il, the 
infamous dictator of North Korea, was still alive and in charge of the countries leadership. After 
some year of speculations about his health problems, he was clearly back on stage. However, no 
matter how bright his smile was while posing next to Bill Clinton, he was not the man he used to 
be. Only his clear loss of weight already showed that he has had—and may still have—serious 
health problems. Next to the stroke he had in 2008, as foreign intelligence services claim, there 
are also speculations that Kim suffers from pancreatic cancer, diabetes, and heart diseases. 
Some sources speculate that the life expectation of North Korea's "Dear Leader" may be five 
years maximum.[1] 
What would the death of Kim Jong Il mean for North Korea, and, in broader view, for the world? 
Several scenario’s exist on the future of North Korea after the reign of Kim Jong Il, varying from a 
smooth transition of power to his youngest son to an outbreak of anarchy and chaos. This essay 
attempts to identify the—in the view of the author—most realistic scenarios and their implications 
for the international community.[2] 
From Father to Son 
In 1994 Kim Jong Il succeeded his father Kim Il Sung, who lead the country with firm hand since 
its establishment after the Second World War until his death. Even in 1994 a lot of speculations 
circulated about the upcoming implosion of the North Korean communistic regime; the Cold War 
had ended, the country’s economy had completely collapsed and Kim Jong Il was not known as 
someone with a lot of power and prestige within the North Korean ruling elite. To everyone’s 
surprise, however, no problems at all seemed to arise in Pyongyang. The succession from father 
to son went smoother then anyone could expect. Although Kim Jong Il did not operate as much in 
public as his father used to do, he steadily built on his domestic mythical status, and after some 
three years no one doubted his all-embracing power in North Korea anymore. 
After his public appearances suddenly came to an end in 2008, except from some manipulated 
(elder) photographs, speculations started about the succession of Kim Jong Il himself. Suspicions 
about serious health problems were strengthened when, quite suddenly, his youngest son Kim 
Jong Un was put forward as the successor to come. At least, that is what analysts concluded 
when Kim Jong Un was appointed at some important political positions and when new 
propaganda was noticed, seemingly designed to increase the stature of his personality. Most 
observers assume that Kim Jong Un is being prepared to succeed his father as leader of the 
state.[3] 
Scenario 1: Smooth Succession 
The most obvious scenario on the future of North Korea builds on the developments in 1994 
when Kim Il Sung died. In this scenario, when Kim Jong Il dies his son Kim Jong Un will be 
pushed forward as the third generation of the ‘mythical’ ruling Kim family. Just like Kim Jong Il, his 
son will probably stay out of the spotlights at first, meanwhile focusing on his power consolidation 
and his domestic public image. Within a year or two everyone, both inside as outside North 
Korea, will consider him the self-evident leader of the state. While succeeding his father, Kim 
Jong Un can rely on the support of the country’s military and political elite. The strength of the 
North Korean regime is that anyone within the elite benefits from stability only, because any 
change can only have a negative influence on their privileged luxury life amidst the hungry 
population.[4] 
In this scenario the succession from father to son will pass that smooth that nothing will change in 
North Korea. The world will not get rid of this pariah state some other years or even decades. 
North Korea is not only infamous because of its human rights violations, humanitarian 
emergencies, illegal activities like counterfeiting, illegal gambling activities and the production and 
smuggling of drugs and weapons, but most of all because of its political provocations, including 
nuclear tests, missile launches and nuclear proliferation activities. When this scenario becomes 
reality, the international community will have to go on finding a way to deal with this uncommon 
regime and its ‘rogue’ activities, just like it is trying for years already. 
It is, by the way, not unthinkable that this scenario may start even sooner then the death of Kim 
Jong Il. Some analyst assume that Kim Jong Il, when he will have time of life, wishes to transfer 
his power to Kim Jong Un in April 2012. In that month the founder of the state, Kim Il Sung, would 
have become a hundred years old. 
Scenario 2: Struggle for Power 
A second scenario on the future of North Korea is less positive about the unity within the 
country’s elite. Supporters of this scenario expect a struggle for power within this elite as soon as 
Kim Jong Il passes away. Like a good dictator befits, they argue, Kim Jong Il uses a tactic of 
‘divide and rule’ to stay in power. Within the North Korean elite several factions are opposing 
each other, and it is only their ‘Dear Leader’ that holds them together. These factions are also 
supporting different successors for Kim. Next to groups who support Kim Jong Un, especially 
Kim’s eldest son, Kim Jong Nam, is said to have quite some support within the elite. People who 
have supported Kim Jong Nam during the last years, are said to fear for their lives when Kim 
Jong Un and his supporters will come to power. To prevent a day of reckoning in which they will 
be punished for supporting the ‘wrong’ son, this faction could initiate a struggle for power 
immediately after the death of Kim Jong Il. Some experts also think a power struggle might occur 
because some groups within the elite doubt the leadership capabilities of Kim Jong Un and prefer 
a military junta to lead the country instead. 
This power struggle scenario can be made in two variants, depending on the outcome. In the first 
variant, the struggle is short and the world will hardly notice. A new leader will come forward from 
the power struggle, whether it is Kim Jong Un or someone else, and with support of the (surviving 
part of the) elite this leader will reign the country just like Kim Jong Il did. Maybe there will not 
come forward one broadly supported winner of the power struggle, but will a military junta be 
installed—possibly with Myanmar in mind. Even such a junta would presumably not make much 
difference for the world outside. Whoever comes to power in North Korea, stability will be the first 
priority so in general the policy of Kim Jong Il will be continued. 
The second variant has a ‘chaotic’ outcome: no winner comes out of the power struggle and the 
regime collapses while struggling. Because the North Korean governing system is very 
centralized, a power vacuum at the top will immediately cause problems elsewhere in the system. 
Observers who support this variant argue that a power struggle at the top will unavoidable start 
the implosion of the regime, leaving the country in anarchy and chaos.[5] What will happen next, 
is explained in scenarios 3 and 4. 
Scenario 3: Chaos and Chinese Intervention 
The third scenario builds on the second scenario. In this scenario the succession from father to 
son fails and a power struggle and/or chaos arise. The difference with the previous scenario, 
however, is that China will not tolerate North Korea to fall into chaos and will intervene. 
China attaches great strategic value to North Korea. The leadership in Beijing regards North 
Korea as a buffer-state keeping the sphere of influence of the United States—South Korea, 
Japan and Taiwan—at a distance. Above all, however, China wishes stability. The fundamental 
long term policy of the Chinese government is that domestic stability, sustained by economic 
progress, has top priority. Chaos at the borders is not at all contributing to this policy, especially 
not when, like in the North Korean case, large flows of hungry refugees are expected to cross the 
border into China. Chaos in North Korea may have a destabilizing influence on the Chinese 
border areas, which is even more undesirable considering the fact that the Chinese provinces 
bordering North Korea are densely populated and of considerable economic importance. 
Although China officially advocates non-intervention as a standard in its foreign policy, the strong 
wish for stability will probably be more important that the non-intervention principle. 
As soon as the regime in North Korea starts to totter, China will intervene, supporters of this 
scenario assert. Detailed plans on intervention in North Korea are already available in Beijing, 
some sources state.[6] Large-scale intervention is something China would preferable prevent, so 
action should take place before sending large amounts of troops into North Korea would be 
required. In case a power struggle starts in Pyongyang, China wants to prevent the struggle to 
seep through from the top toward lower governmental levels. This is why, considering supporters 
of this scenario, China will intervene at an early stage of the power struggle by replacing the top 
level by a Chinese-minded puppet government that will take firm control of the country. 
This scenario may seem quite unrealistic, probably only useful for a James Bond movie. 
Nevertheless, this scenario is more plausible then at first sight may appear, some analysts argue. 
Because all levels of the North Korean elite have a lot to gain by keeping the system stable, a 
smooth replacement of the top level while leaving the rest of the elite untouched may meet little 
resistance. Moreover, except from this strong wish for stability within the North Korean elite, well 
targeted Chinese economic aid and investments could be helpful to softly remove any unrest 
among this elite. Presumably, the newly Chinese installed top will slowly start economic reforms, 
just like happened in China itself: aiming for a combination of a communist political system and a 
semi-capitalist economy. This kind of reforms will require a lot of patience and investments during 
a long period, to prevent any unrest. The positive aspect about this scenario, its supporters claim, 
is that the world will be at least freed of the ‘rogue activities’ of the North Korean regime. 
Even skeptics of this early Chinese intervention scenario agree that China may want to intervene 
as soon as stability at its border may be threatened by a collapsing North Korean regime. Even 
when the scenario in which China will replace the North Korean political top is deemed too 
unrealistic, most analysts agree that China has plans available to take action when instability is 
looming. Plans are said to have been developed to close hermetically the borders with North 
Korea, and to develop troops into the North to provide humanitarian aid to the population, to 
establish some law and order, and maybe even to secure nuclear weapons and materials. It is 
often assumed that China would prefer a United Nations mandate for these actions, and some 
experts even expect that China would prefer to start a UN operation jointly lead by China, South 
Korea and the United States.[7] More information on this joint intervention can be found under 
scenario 4 in this essay. Besides, some analysts suppose that China is preparing a joint 
intervention with Russia to intervene and stabilize North Korea when necessary—not only to 
prevent instability at their borders, but also to prevent a US intervention.[8] 
Scenario 4: Chaos and International Intervention 
Just like the third scenario, the fourth scenario also builds on the second one, where a power 
struggle was described, ending in anarchy and chaos. In this fourth scenario, it is an international 
coalition that will intervene, most likely under the flag of the United Nations, trying to stabilize the 
situation in North Korea. 
Not every analyst values this scenario as very plausible, because not much states will be eager to 
send troops into a chaotic North Korea—not even South Korea and the United States. The North 
Korean population will most probably consider every foreign military as an enemy, as a 
consequence of a lifetime of paranoid state propaganda and brainwashing. Combined with the 
abundant amount of (heavy) weapons available, this paranoid attitude may turn a (humanitarian) 
intervention into guerrilla warfare. This is why experts argue that an intervention should take 
place before the North Korean system seriously collapses. Such an early intervention is, 
however, only feasible when operated by China. The Chinese are the only foreigners that have 
some confidence among the North Koreans, being an ally for decades already. A Chinese early 
intervention, or in other words: a coup d’état, could possibly be accepted by the governing levels 
under the direct top—see scenario 3. 
Perhaps, however, South Korean forces might also be welcomed by the North Korean population 
in serious emergency situations like chaos and famine. Even in spite of the state propaganda 
picturing South Korea as a pro American enemy, South Koreans are still considered brethren to 
some extent. Some experts therefore argue that an international intervention led by South Korea 
may be the best option to stabilize an imploded North Korea.[9] Even a UN intervention that is 
jointly lead by China, South Korea and the United States may not be excluded, although it could 
be questioned whether these countries could come to an agreement about what will be the policy 
on the future of North Korea after the intervention. 
One way or another, when North Korea will sink into anarchy and chaos, the international 
community will have to do something. There is no doubt that the neighboring countries will keep 
their borders closed to prevent being flooded with hungry, brainwashed North Koreans (who are 
also considered work-shy and socially maladjusted by much South Koreans). The first priority for 
the international community will no doubt be preventing the chaos to cross the borders. 
Stabilizing North Korea itself and providing aid to the population will be second in line. When an 
international military force will be deployed to stabilize the country, it is expected that an 
international interim government will be installed in Pyongyang. This interim government should 
prepare North Korea for unification with South Korea. Considering the giant social and 
economical gap between the two Koreas, this will be a very long term process. Analysts estimate 
it may take 25 to even 60 years before North Korea will be ready for unification—that is, if one 
wants to prevent South Korea to collapse under the burden of unification. 
The Impossibility to Predict 
Predicting developments on the Korean peninsula is a dangerous activity, because few affairs are 
as capricious as national and international politics. Nevertheless, it is always good to be prepared 
for possible developments. Even though it seems most plausible that North Korea will survive 
almost unchanged for another decade or two—see scenario 1 and 2—it can not be excluded that 
the regime will suddenly implode. The collapse of the Soviet Union, to mention just one example, 
came rather unexpected too. 
What becomes quite clear in this article, is that the United States and its Western allies do not 
seem to play a key role in the scenarios presented. North Korea itself, China, and to a lesser 
extent South Korea are the key players when reflecting on possible future developments at the 
Korean peninsula. Only in the fourth scenario, when discussing the possibilities of an intervention 
by the international community, the United States may play a major role. Even while watching 
developments closely from the sideline, however, it is good to be prepared for possible 
developments that may require sudden action. 
This article does not aim to predict anything about the future of North Korea, but is only 
presenting four scenarios that may be useful while reflecting on the subject. Although it is not 
clear which of the presented scenarios may become reality—maybe even none of them—it is 
without doubt to be recommended for the international community to be prepared for everything. 
That could be muddling on with the (nuclear) provocations from Pyongyang, but also dealing with 
sudden chaos at the Korean peninsula. Having flexible and adaptive plans available to deal with 
this spectrum of possibilities is certainly advisable. 
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